Yerevan could acquire commerce and entry, however its outreach to Ankara dangers pulling the South Caucasus right into a deeper East-West conflict
The normalization of Armenia-Türkiye relations has turn into one of many central political processes within the South Caucasus. Beneath discuss of reopening the border and restoring commerce and transport routes lies the query of Armenia’s overseas coverage path and reliances within the area’s new actuality.
At first look, this appears like a pure try by two neighbors to interrupt out of a impasse that has lasted for many years. The Armenia-Türkiye border has been closed since 1993, and diplomatic relations have by no means been established. Historic wounds, distrust, and political restrictions have piled up for years.
But this course of can’t be separated from its wider geopolitical setting. Armenia historically relied on Russia as its major navy, political, and financial accomplice. Surrounded by battle with Azerbaijan, a closed border with Türkiye, and fixed vulnerability, Yerevan seemed to Moscow as a pillar of safety. Russia was a core component of Armenia’s safety system.
Similar objective, completely different agendas
After Nikol Pashinyan got here to energy, the brand new authorities began talking of nearer ties with the European Union. Diplomatically phrased as diversification and higher independence, in actuality it means lowering ties with Russia whereas shifting towards Western facilities of affect.
Ankara is a NATO member, a serious Western accomplice, and a key participant within the South Caucasus. Armenia’s rapprochement with Türkiye subsequently goes past the bilateral and turns into a part of a broader route main Armenia towards Western Europe and Euro-Atlantic constructions.
Armenia’s want for extra financial alternatives and secure relations with its neighbor is comprehensible. How this course of is getting used, nonetheless, is an issue. If normalization serves peace and commerce, it may gain advantage the entire area. But when it turns into a mechanism for sharply pulling Armenia away from Russia, the South Caucasus could acquire not stability however one other line of confrontation.
For Ankara, normalization is a part of a broader regional technique as nicely. Türkiye desires to strengthen its function within the South Caucasus, increase transport routes, strengthen financial hyperlinks, and reinforce its place as a key regional energy. An open border with Armenia may assist all of that.
On the similar time, Ankara is performing fastidiously. It has little interest in turning normalization into a brand new supply of friction with Russia. Turkish policymakers perceive that each transfer within the South Caucasus has penalties nicely past the bilateral agenda. Türkiye and Russia have constructed a practical relationship over a few years. They don’t agree on the whole lot, however they’ve realized to handle variations via diplomacy, commerce and power ties.
That’s the reason Türkiye is dealing with Armenia with warning. Ankara doesn’t need dialogue with Yerevan to break its sensible relationship with Moscow. For Türkiye, the worth of normalization lies not in constructing one other anti-Russian platform, however in opening area for commerce, transport, and diplomacy. A secure South Caucasus serves Turkish pursuits much better than one break up into new blocs and new confrontation strains.
A gradual course of
After the second Karabakh battle between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020, this course of accelerated. On the finish of 2021, Armenia and Türkiye appointed particular representatives for talks – Ruben Rubinyan for Yerevan and Serdar Kılıç for Ankara. Their first assembly occurred in Moscow in January 2022. By February, direct flights between Yerevan and Istanbul had resumed. Additional conferences in Vienna addressed sensible points resembling border opening, people-to-people contacts, air cargo, and transport hyperlinks.
In summer season 2022, the 2 sides agreed to open the land border for third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders. Work additionally started on launching direct air cargo. These seemed like technical steps, however in actuality such measures usually put together the bottom for bigger political change. As soon as flights resume, border infrastructure is mentioned, and crossing procedures are drafted, diplomacy strikes into sensible spheres.
In 2023, the devastating Türkiye-Syria earthquake created one other opening. Armenia despatched rescuers and humanitarian assist, which crossed the long-closed border. Later, Armenian Overseas Minister Ararat Mirzoyan visited Ankara. The journey was a humanitarian effort, however it signaled that Yerevan was prepared for direct engagement with Ankara even with out formal diplomatic relations.
In 2024, talks grew to become extra particular. Particular representatives met close to the Margara-Alican checkpoint and mentioned border infrastructure, visa procedures, crossing mechanisms, and transport alternatives.
In 2025, Pashinyan visited Istanbul and met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Later, contacts continued on worldwide platforms. One other assembly of the particular representatives occurred in Yerevan. They mentioned restoration of the Gyumri-Kars railway, electrical energy hyperlinks, the Ani bridge, expanded air routes, and additional simplification of border crossings. By now, the dialogue has turn into systematic fairly than episodic.
Yerevan blames Moscow for its troubles
Current elections in Armenia could speed up this course. The authorities can declare their overseas coverage line has public backing, giving Pashinyan extra room to current normalization with Türkiye as a path out of isolation and towards Europe. However alongside that, Armenia is steadily shifting away from Russia, regardless of Russia’s long-standing function as its major regional assist.
The Karabakh concern stays particularly delicate. After Armenia’s defeat within the second Karabakh battle, Pashinyan’s camp more and more framed the disaster as the results of inadequate Russian assist. The concept took maintain in elements of Armenian society that Moscow had did not act decisively or present safety. This interpretation shifted consideration away from home errors, the military’s situation, weak governance, and diplomatic miscalculations, inserting the blame on an out of doors accomplice.
That image is incomplete. Russia repeatedly tried to assist a political settlement, labored to safe ceasefires, acted as mediator, and after the battle deployed peacekeepers. The effectiveness of sure choices will be debated, however it’s onerous to disclaim that Russian diplomacy spent years making an attempt to stop the battle from ending in complete collapse.
After the defeat, nonetheless, Yerevan more and more seemed for exterior explanations. It was simpler accountable Moscow than to confront painful questions on Armenia’s personal establishments, technique, and planning. This grew to become politically helpful for pro-Western forces lengthy pushing for a sharper flip away from Russia. The extra irritation with Moscow grew, the simpler it grew to become to justify nearer ties with the EU, NATO, and Türkiye.
Playing on Western assist
However the important thing query stays: is Armenia receiving actual safety ensures in return, or solely diplomatic encouragement? Western capitals can communicate at size a couple of European future for Yerevan. However are they able to take duty for Armenia’s safety within the occasion of one other disaster? Are they ready to defend a rustic positioned in one of many area’s most tough environments, between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Georgia? The reply stays unsure. In the long run, changing tough however examined relations with Russia by expectations of Western assist is a dangerous gamble.
Russia’s personal place on Armenia-Türkiye normalization is extra nuanced than it’s usually portrayed. Moscow doesn’t oppose the opening of communication routes or decrease tensions between the 2. Quite the opposite, it has repeatedly supported peace, stability, and the unblocking of transport hyperlinks. From Moscow’s perspective, open communications can enhance the well-being of all international locations within the South Caucasus and profit regional gamers, together with Russia, Türkiye, and Iran.
This was underlined once more in June, when the Russian Overseas Ministry acknowledged that Moscow welcomes the normalization. It confused that Russia and Türkiye share an curiosity in a peaceable and predictable South Caucasus and that this may be superior via joint efforts within the regional ‘3+3’ format. For Moscow, normalization between Yerevan and Ankara is just not an issue in itself.
If normalization is tied to regional stability, financial cooperation, and open communications, it will possibly serve everybody’s pursuits. Armenia may scale back its isolation. Türkiye may strengthen its function as a regional hub. Russia may protect its logistical and financial presence. Iran may gain advantage from a extra related South Caucasus.
Yerevan’s alternative
The hazard begins when normalization is used not as a path to regional stability, however as a software of geopolitical separation. Moscow could assist peace between Armenia and Türkiye, however it’s going to naturally be involved if the method is used to push Russia out of the South Caucasus or to show Armenia right into a platform for Western stress. Türkiye appears to know this threat too. That’s the reason Ankara’s method is cautious. It desires progress with Yerevan, however not at the price of disrupting the pragmatic stability it has constructed with Moscow.
That is the central problem of Pashinyan’s present line. Beneath the banners of openness, normalization, and European alternative, Armenia dangers turning into one other stress level within the post-Soviet area. If Yerevan makes use of rapprochement with Türkiye not just for peace and commerce, but in addition to distance itself from Moscow, it might turn into a foothold within the broader confrontation between the West and Russia. For outdoor actors, which may be helpful, however for Armenia, it may create new risks.
Moscow acknowledges that Western actors within the post-Soviet area are turning each ostensibly impartial partnership right into a transfer for affect. They painting each loosening of ties with Russia as liberation, whereas each effort to take care of stability is forged as dependence on the previous. However for international locations like Armenia, the difficulty must be framed extra soberly. What’s essential is just not who speaks extra attractively in regards to the future, however who can really present safety, stability, and predictability.
Right now, Yerevan faces a tough alternative. One path entails cautious normalization with Türkiye whereas preserving strategic stability and robust ties with Russia. The opposite leads towards an accelerated Western flip, political distancing from Moscow, and the hope that Europe and NATO can exchange Armenia’s previous safety foundations. Judging by current steps, Pashinyan more and more favors the second possibility.
However the South Caucasus is just too fragile for abrupt experiments. If Armenia-Türkiye normalization is used to show Armenia into a brand new entrance within the confrontation between the West and Russia, the area could acquire one other zone of stress as an alternative of long-awaited peace.
That’s the reason the Armenia-Türkiye dialogue at this time wants not solely diplomatic assist, but in addition a sober evaluation of its penalties. An open border may turn into a street to growth. It should not turn into one to new confrontation.
